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The Universal Declaration and Developments 
in the Enforcement of International Human 
Rights in Domestic Law 
MICHAEL VAN ALSTINE* 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged in a time of 
high-minded hope in the ability of aspirations to propel law and law 
to control power.  ―It is essential,‖ the Declaration thus proclaims, 
―that human rights should be protected by the rule of law‖ as an 
antidote, among other things, to the reactive violence justified by 
―tyranny and oppression.‖1  This hope, however, was one tempered 
by experience with the human tendency to contrary impulses, and in 
particular by a painful familiarity with a half-century of near 
―universal‖ warfare.  The immediate historical context of the 
Declaration, in other words, provided a blunt example of the capacity 
of power to control law. 
As they assembled in the aftermath of World War II, therefore, the 
drafters of what became the Universal Declaration could have had 
few illusions about the ability of words alone to constrain domestic 
tyrants.  The United Nations itself had few institutions or mech-
anisms for immediate enforcement, and none of any practical 
significance for individuals with particularized grievances.  With this 
background, any bold attempt to declare immediately applicable 
international human rights ―law‖ risked an appearance of detachment 
from the realities of law enforcement.  As a founder of the U.S. 
American constitutional system had observed over a century and a 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. 
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl., para. 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
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half earlier, ―[i]f there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the 
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, 
amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.‖2 
Certainly aware of such sentiments, the drafters of the Universal 
Declaration opted for a longer-term perspective.  They did not set as 
the goal of the enterprise the creation of conventional legal norms for 
immediate enforcement by state or even international institutions.  
The animating spirit of the Universal Declaration was instead one of 
hope.  Though clearly ―an extraordinary achievement at the time,‖ as 
Oscar Schachter has aptly observed, ―[i]n 1948 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights . . . was cautiously declared to express 
aspirations, but not binding law.‖3  In its initial, fundamental 
conception, therefore, the Declaration did not purport to create 
binding norms even in the international legal system, a point U.S. 
American courts have emphasized with regularity.4 
But aspirations, especially those solemnly declared, can plant the 
seeds of fundamental change.  And as we reflect on the occasion of 
its 60
th
 anniversary, by all appearances the seeds sown by the solemn 
aspirations of the Universal Declaration have already propelled quite 
remarkable changes in perspectives and even law itself.  In a 
substantive sense, the Declaration has inspired progressive growth in 
a variety of more specific fields of human rights law at an 
international level, as the papers prepared for the other panels in this 
Conference explore in more detail.  To be sure, the substantive 
domestic law effect of even these second generation human rights 
efforts remains uneven.5   
But what the drafters of the Declaration may not have anticipated 
 
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 5th prtg. 
1999). 
3. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (1994). 
4. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (―[T]he Declaration 
does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.‖); Flores v. S. 
Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the Universal Declaration 
does not reflect customary international law because it is merely aspirational in nature); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declaring that the 
UDHR is a merely ―precatory‖ document, designed as a statement of ideals and aspirations 
that does not create any legal obligations); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 
1010 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (observing that the Declaration has only ―moral authority‖ and has no 
legally binding force).  
5. See infra note 9 and accompanying text (relating, as an example, the experience in the 
United States with the ICCPR and the ICESCR). 
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is how broadly and fundamentally domestic constitutional systems 
have subsequently adapted to embrace international law in general, 
and in some cases even the Universal Declaration in particular.  My 
goal here is to set the framework for understanding the significance 
of these changes in domestic constitutional law in the sixty years 
since the adoption of the Universal Declaration.  In specific, I will 
trace below how, in numerous respects, the strikingly varied 
constitutional systems of the world now share some structural 
similarities on the direct reception of international law in, or as, 
domestic law. 
Indeed, this has become a common, express feature when drafters 
set about crafting modern constitutions.  But the direct enforcement 
of customary international law by domestic courts and other legal 
institutions is not limited to these innovative, modern systems.  It is 
also now an accepted principle in the interpretation of many long-
established constitutional systems, even those firmly entrenched in 
the dualist tradition.  Though by no means a universal phenomenon, 
the extent of this modern trend is worthy of emphasis on an important 
occasion such as this anniversary. 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 
The Universal Declaration came into being in the context of a 
structural challenge for the actual enforcement of the international 
human ―rights‖ it sought to define and protect.  Even in the modern 
age of the middle of the last century, the basic premise of the 
traditional international legal system was that states, and states alone, 
were both its subjects and objects.  States could, of course, bind 
themselves by conventional international law to protect the rights of 
individuals—and in certain limited spheres states have done just that 
for some time.6  At particular points, customary international law 
likewise created obligations that ran in favor of individuals and 
against states.  Stated in broad terms, the fundamental goal of the 
Universal Declaration was to expand these examples to the broad 
 
6.  A prominent example of states agreeing by treaty to create directly enforceable rights 
in favor of individuals is found in so-called treaties of ―amity, commerce and navigation,‖ 
which have existed for well over two centuries.  For the United States see, for example, the 
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 18, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; and 
the Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 Stat. 138.  
Over sixty such treaties are now in force for the United States alone.  See note following 8 
U.S.C. 1101 (2003) (listing such treaties). 
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field of international human rights, both by inspiring express 
adoption in future formal treaties and by initiating the dialogue and 
actions necessary for the recognition of customary international law. 
The challenge arose, however, with the forum for the vindication 
of those individual rights.  Absent express consent, international law 
generally required states neither to submit to suits by individuals in 
foreign courts nor to open their own for the same purpose—par in 
parem non habet jurisdictionem, as the traditional Latin phrase runs.  
To be sure, international juridical institutions such as the Inter-
national Court of Justice could declare the violation of individual 
rights by states under international law.  But without more effective 
enforcement mechanisms at the international level, the force of these 
individual rights in practical terms depended on their reception as law 
in domestic legal systems.  The challenge, in other words, was 
whether the individual rights secured in international law were 
subject to direct recognition and enforcement in domestic courts at 
the behest of the individuals themselves. 
Viewed from the perspective of international human rights law, 
the Universal Declaration has had significant influence in the sixty 
years since its birth.  Thus, for example, subsequent formal treaties 
have affirmed some noteworthy aspects of the Universal Declaration, 
most notably of course the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights7 and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.8  These treaties in turn have found broad 
acceptance at an international level.  In the important respect of 
propelling the progressive agreement on formal treaties on inter-
national human rights law, therefore, the Universal Declaration is 
already much of a success. 
Even for formal treaties, however, the translation into immediately 
enforceable domestic law requires a substantially more nuanced 
analysis.  For, with quite rare exceptions, domestic constitutions 
require some form of formal approval by municipal legislatures 
before treaties may function as directly enforceable law.  In some 
cases and to some extent, domestic courts have directly applied these 
subsequent formal treaties to protect individual rights.  But more 
commonly, notions of ―direct effect‖ or ―self-execution‖ have 
functioned as significant impediments to domestic enforcement.  And 
 
7. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
8. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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in some states, such as the United States, these doctrines have 
effectively precluded the direct enforcement even of the second 
generation human rights treaties they have expressly ratified.9 
My focus here, however, is on the broader and more fundamental 
question of the domestic law force of the norms reflected in the 
Universal Declaration through their distillation into customary inter-
national law.  For this form of international law, enforcement by 
domestic courts and other institutions depends almost exclusively on 
the general approach to the reception of international law by their 
respective constitutional systems.  And in this respect, the last sixty 
years have witnessed some quite interesting developments in modern 
constitutional law at the municipal level.  As a forthcoming, multi-
country work on the subject explores,10 a striking congruence exists 
among quite divergent legal systems on the direct applicability of 
norms of customary international law the formal sanction of domestic 
lawmaking procedures is absent.  This principle is particularly true 
for constitutions that came into force after the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration.  But it may surprise that the rules of 
customary international law also have a direct effect in a number of 
states that hew closely to the traditional dualist separation of 
international and domestic law. 
In the pages that follow, I will review some of the more 
noteworthy examples of this modern development in domestic 
constitutional law.  These constitutions create a framework for the 
enforcement in domestic law of the international human rights the 
Universal Declaration originally sought to promote and protect. 
 
9. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 728 (noting that upon ratification the United 
States declared that the substantive provisions of the ICCPR ―were not self-executing‖ and 
that, therefore, ―the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of 
interpreting and applying‖ that treaty).  Accordingly, federal appellate courts have expressly 
refused to give domestic law effect to the ICCPR.  See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 
248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2001); Igartua 
De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
10. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: 
Summary and Conclusions, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at sec. II.E., on file 
with author). 
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Perhaps the most prominent examples of the international law 
friendly constitutions adopted since the end of World War II are 
those of Germany, Russia, and South Africa.  The German ―Basic 
Law‖ (Grundgesetz) of 1949 contains a particularly stark affirmation 
of the direct effect of customary international law.  Its Article 25 
explicitly declares that the ―[t]he general rules of international law 
are an integral part of federal law.‖11  Lest there be any doubt, the 
same provision emphasizes that such norms ―directly create rights 
and duties for the residents‖ of the country.12  Indeed, it also declares 
that the general rules of international law even ―take precedence over 
statutory law.‖13  A special jurisdictional provision in the Grund-
gesetz also delegates exclusive authority over issues of customary 
international law—and thus over its direct effect in domestic law—to 
the German Constitutional Court.14 
The South African Constitution of 1996 contains some of the most 
detailed provisions on the direct effect and other influence of 
international law.  A special section directed solely to the subject 
(Section 232) declares that ―[c]ustomary international law is law in 
the Republic‖15 (although, unlike Germany, such norms of an 
international origin must yield to statutory law adopted by the 
Parliament16).  Separately, the Constitution expressly sets forth an 
instruction, which commonly applies in other countries as well, that 
domestic courts must prefer an interpretation of legislation ―that is 
consistent with international law.‖17  More fundamentally, the 
Constitution directs domestic courts to interpret its own Bill of 
Rights, which was fashioned around international human rights 
documents such as the Universal Declaration, with reference to 
 
11. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] art. 25 
(F.R.G.) (translation by author). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. art. 100(2) (providing that if any doubt arises in a lower court over ―whether a 
rule of international law is part of federal law and whether it directly creates rights and 
obligations for individuals,‖ then the court shall refer the matter to the Federal Constitutional 
Court) (translation by author). 
15. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 232. 
16. Id. (providing that customary international law does not apply if ―it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament‖). 
17. Id. s. 233. 
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international law.18 
The Russian Federation’s Constitution of 1993 sets forth similarly 
broad principles on the direct effect of customary international law.  
Article 15(4) of the Constitution declares that, in addition to treaties, 
all ―[g]enerally recognized principles and norms of international 
law . . . shall be an integral part‖ of the Russian legal system.19 
These exemplars of Germany, Russia, and South Africa are by no 
means anomalies.  Numerous other constitutions adopted or adapted 
after the Universal Declaration declare similar principles.  A common 
feature of these modern constitutions is an express declaration that 
customary international law forms a direct part of the country’s 
domestic law.  The Serbian Constitution of 2006, for example, 
declares not only that ―[g]enerally accepted rules of international 
law . . . shall be an integral part of the legal system in the Republic of 
Serbia,‖ but also that such rules shall be ―applied directly.‖20  The 
Greek Constitution of 2001 likewise affirms that ―[t]he generally 
recognized rules of international law . . . shall be an integral part of 
domestic Greek law.‖21  Indeed, like the German Grundgesetz, the 
same provision in the Greek Constitution states that such inter-
national law rules ―shall prevail over any contrary provision of the 
law.‖22  In the same vein, the Constitution of Austria as reconstituted 
in 1945 provides that ―[t]he generally recognized rules of inter-
national law . . . shall be an integral part of federal law.‖23  A number 
of other constitutions have express provisions to the same effect, 
including the Philippines Constitution of 1987,24 the Portuguese 
Constitution of 1976,25 the Namibian Constitution of 1990,26 the 
 
18. Id. s. 39 (stating that ―[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum . . . must consider international law‖). 
19. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15(4) (Russ.). 
20. Const. of the Republic of Serb. 2006, art. 16. 
21. 1975 Syntagma [SYN] art. 28 (Greece). 
22. Id. 
23. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1930, as last amended 
by Bundesgesetz [BG] BGBl I No. 100/2003, art. 9 (Austria). 
24. CONST. (1987), Art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.) (―The Philippines . . . adopts the generally 
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land . . . .‖). 
25. Const. of the Portuguese Republic 1976, art. 8(1) (―The rules and principles of 
general or ordinary international law are an integral part of Portuguese law.‖). 
26. Const. of the Republic of Namib. 1990, art. 144 (―Unless otherwise provided by this 
Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public international law . . . shall form 
part of the law of Namibia.‖). 
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Slovenian Constitution of 1991,27 and the Estonian Constitution of 
1992.28  
Similarly directed provisions in other modern constitutions simply 
declare that the state must conform to international law.  The Polish 
Constitution of 1997, for example, proclaims that ―[t]he Republic of 
Poland shall respect international law binding upon it.‖29  The Italian 
Constitution of 1948 likewise states, in a provision solely directed to 
the subject, that ―the legal system of Italy conforms to all generally 
recognized principles of international law.‖30  The modern consti-
tutions of Belarus,31 Georgia,32 Hungary,33 and Mongolia34 contain 
similar declarations. 
Some modern Constitutions have even expressly granted domestic 
law force to the Universal Declaration by name.  The two most 
prominent examples are the Constitutions of Spain and Argentina.  
Section 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 expressly requires 
that the provisions ―relating to the fundamental rights and liberties 
recognized by the Constitution shall be construed in conformity with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.‖35 
A special modern amendment to the Constitution of Argentina is 
 
27. Const. of the Republic of Slovenia 1991 (as amended), art. 8 (―Laws and regulations 
must comply with generally accepted principles of international law . . . .‖); see also id. art. 
153 (―Laws must be in conformity with generally accepted principles of international law.‖). 
28. Const. of the Republic of Estonia 1992, art. 3(1) (―Universally recognized principles 
and norms of international law shall be an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system.‖); 
cf. Const. of the Republic of Bulgaria 1992, art. 149(l)(4) (granting to the Bulgarian Consti-
tutional Court the power to ―rule on the compatibility of domestic laws with the universally 
recognized norms of international law‖). 
29. Const. of the Republic of Poland 1997, art. 9. 
30. COST. [Constitution] art. 10 (Italy). 
31. Const. of the Republic of Belarus 1994, art. 8 (―The Republic of Belarus shall 
recognize the supremacy of the universally acknowledged principles of international law and 
ensure that its laws comply with such principles.‖). 
32. Const. of Georgia 1995, art. 6(2) (―The legislation of Georgia shall correspond to 
universally recognised principles and rules of international law.‖).   
33. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA art. 7(1) (Hung.) (―The legal system of the 
Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized principles of international law, and 
shall harmonize the country’s domestic law with the obligations assumed under international 
law.‖). 
34. Const. of Mongolia 1992, art. 10(1) (―Mongolia adheres to the universally 
recognized norms and principles of international law . . .‖). 
35. Constitución [C.E.] art. 10(2) (Spain); see also Constitution of the Republic of 
Yemen 1994, art. 5 (―The state shall abide by the United Nations Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the League of Arab States and the generally 
accepted norms of international law.‖). 
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even broader.  It identifies by name not only the Universal 
Declaration, but also a number of the principal international treaties 
designed to protect individual and collective human rights.  In 
specific, a provision on the powers of the Congress of Argentina 
proclaims that these named international human rights treaties 
together with ―the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . have 
constitutional hierarchy in the full force of their provisions.‖36  
Although they do not supplant other constitutional principles, these 
international law norms ―are to be understood as complementing the 
rights and guarantees recognized‖ in the Constitution.37  The same 
provision then entrenches the rights in the Universal Declaration and 
the other identified instruments by establishing a special two-thirds 
voting requirement in both houses of the national legislature for any 
attempt at denunciation.38 
Interestingly, even some states that follow a purer dualist approach 
to the interaction of international treaties and domestic law have 
recognized the direct effect of customary international law.  In broad 
terms, this tradition separates international treaty-making by the 
national executive from the required domestic treaty-implementation 
by the legislature.  The states that follow this tradition include 
Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom.  Perhaps 
ironically, in the forthcoming work on treaty enforcement noted 
above,39 the country chapters for all five of these states report that 
domestic courts have recognized the direct effect of the rules of 
customary international law even without formal endorsement by the 
legislature.40 
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India is worthy of 
special note in this regard.  Under its so-called ―Doctrine of 
Incorporation,‖ the rules of customary international law have direct 
and automatic effect in the domestic legal system of India.41  This 
principle follows from the reasoning that the state policy of India as 
reflected in its Constitution favors domestic law compliance with the 
country’s international obligations.  As the Indian Supreme Court 
thus declared in a landmark ruling of 1984, ―[t]he comity of nations 
 
36. Constitución Argentina [CONST. ARG.] sec. 75(22). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See Van Alstine, supra note 10, sec. II.E. 
40. Id. 
41. See id. (summarizing the more detailed review in the chapter for India). 
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requires that rules of international law may be accommodated in the 
municipal law even without express legislative sanction, provided 
they do not run into conflict with Acts of Parliament.‖42 
Unfortunately, the approach of the United States to the direct effect 
of customary international law is subject to some doubt.  The well-
known and long-accepted view, as reflected in the famous Paquete 
Habana case of 1900, is that ―international law is part of our law.‖43  
But more modern Supreme Court opinions have left some confusion 
in their wake.  The Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,44 for example, quoted The Paquete Habana’s famous 
declaration with approval.45  But it did not then simply apply 
customary international law.  Rather, the Court focused narrowly on 
the original intent of Congress in adopting the jurisdictional statute at 
issue.46  Moreover, in a string of recent cases culminating in Medellín 
v. Texas,47 the Supreme Court refused to enforce undisputed 
international law obligations of the United States, even those founded 
in treaties and expressly declared by the International Court of 
Justice.48 
This noteworthy distraction aside, the message from a review of 
modern constitutional developments is that international law pro-
tections of individual rights are finding increasing traction in 
domestic law.  The progression, to be sure, has been neither uniform 
nor linear.  And the receptivity to the basic principle has continued to 
parallel in an unhealthy way the traditional political, cultural, and 
religious fault lines that divide so many other aspects of the modern 
world.  Easily the most troubling aspect of this division is that in 
some measure it arises from the perception—real or imagined—that 
customary international law itself reflects the particular value set of 
only the industrialized Western world. 
Skeptics also justifiably have raised concerns about the absence of 
 
42. See Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 
667 (India). 
43. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
44. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
45. Id. at 729. 
46. Id. at 720 (concluding based on a review of history that Congress intended the Alien 
Tort Statute ―to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations 
of the law of nations‖). 
47. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
48. Id. at 1356–60. 
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fully transparent democratic procedures for the creation and 
recognition of non-conventional international human rights norms.  
Without formal lawmaking procedures, tyrants may equally well 
corrupt law to be a mask for the naked exercise of power with the 
refrain, ―international law made me do it.‖  In this way, false ―law‖ 
risks becoming merely a means for utilizing power to control real 
law.  Without naming names, careful observers of international 
human rights law will rightly question whether some of the states 
expressly noted above follow, in actual practice, the solemn 
declarations in their constitutions about the domestic force of 
customary international law.  Moreover, the absence of lawmaking 
procedures fully legitimized through democratic processes has led to 
well-grounded concerns by some about the power of unelected 
domestic judges to recognize as binding non-conventional norms of 
international law.  
Nonetheless, as the examples reviewed above attest, the last sixty 
years have witnessed a discernible and serious trend in domestic 
constitutional law toward the express reception of customary 
international law in, or as, domestic law.  The result of this trend is an 
ever firmer framework in domestic law for direct enforcement of 
international human rights by domestic institutions, and in particular 
domestic courts.  In other words, an ever greater number of domestic 
constitutions—through their reception of customary international 
law—now provide a mechanism for individuals to vindicate the 
individual rights recognized on an international law level directly 
against their state’s instrumentalities on a domestic level. 
CONCLUSION 
I do not mean to suggest here that the Universal Declaration now 
exists in some Panglossian world of fully and immediately protected 
international human rights.49  For one thing, a fine-grained apprec-
iation of the actual enforcement of human rights depends as much on 
the attitude of the domestic judges ―in the trenches‖ as it does on 
broad constitutional structures.  Moreover, as the other authors on the 
panel entitled ―The Influence of the Universal Declaration as Law‖ 
have observed, even today international human rights law faces 
 
49.  See FRANÇOIS-MARIE AROUET DE VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE, OR OPTIMISM 293 (1759) 
(containing the famous optimistic statement by Dr. Pangloss at the very end of the book that 
―there is a concatenation of all events in the best of possible worlds‖). 
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significant challenges from countervailing political forces (such as 
executive branch responses to terrorism).  For these and myriad other 
reasons, therefore, I acknowledge immediately that significant 
challenges remain for the international acceptance of the rights 
declared by the Universal Declaration sixty years ago and in 
particular for their regular, uniform, and direct enforcement in 
domestic law. 
Nonetheless, one can say with some level of comfort that the hope 
that animated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sixty years 
ago is even more justified today.  Through its solemnly declared 
aspirations, the Declaration has already accomplished much toward 
propelling the international community to protect human rights in 
law.  And the noteworthy developments in domestic constitutional 
law briefly reviewed here have increasingly created a framework for 
the direct enforcement of those rights in domestic law.  Though by no 
means universal, in short, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
has already provided convincing evidence that aspirations can indeed 
drive law and law can control power. 
 
